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Abstract
We study the capital growth in gambling with (and without) side information and memory effects.
We derive several equalities for gambling, which are of similar form to the Jarzynski equality and
its extension to systems with feedback controls. Those relations provide us with new measures to
quantify the effects of information on the statistics of capital growth in gambling. We discuss the
implications of the equalities and show that they reproduce the known upper bounds of average
capital growth rates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of non-equilibrium equalities, such as the fluctuation theorems and the
Jarzynski equality, is one of the major advances in statistical physics since 1990’s [1–13].
Those relations entail the information about the fluctuations of the entropy production in a
stochastic environment, and are used in deriving the second law of thermodynamics. They
are generalized to the systems with measurements and feedback controls, and the relation
between the extractable work and the information obtained by the measurement is clarified
[14–16]; thereby the paradox of Maxwell’s demon is fully understood [15]. Incorporation
of information processing into thermodynamics is a topic of considerable interest recently
[17–24].
Information is a key to success for gamblers, as well as for demons. The purpose of this
paper is to argue that a similar theoretical framework can be developed for gambling1. The
close connection between the capital growth rate in gambling and information theory is first
noted by Kelly in 1956 [26]. He showed that the optimal growth rate of wealth in repeated
horse races is bounded from above by an information-theoretical quantity, which is the
channel capacity [27]. Kelly also considered a gamble with a help of an informant who tells
the results (which can be wrong) to the gambler before betting. Kelly pointed out that the
increase in the maximum of the average capital growth rate because of the information from
the informant, called “side information,” is quantified by the mutual information between
the side information and the results of the gamble. The idea to maximize the log of the
capital, called the Kelly criterion, is first applied to actual gambling [28] and stock investing
[29] by Thorp, who is the inventor of the card counting2 in blackjack [30]. The theory
of Kelly is introduced into a wider audience by the book “Fortune’s formula” written by
Poundstone [31].
In this paper, we derive several equalities that constrain the statistics of the capital growth
rate in gambling. We first consider a repeated gambling of binary options, each game of
which is independent and identical, and we derive Jarzynski-type equalities in this case. In
the presence of side information, the equality includes the mutual information between the
1 The analogy between the work extraction in a feedback control system and gambling is recently discussed
in Ref. [25].
2 Card counting is a method to improve a gambler’s return by utilizing the information of dealt cards.
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side information and the outcome of the gambling. We then extend the equalities to the
cases with memory effects, in which the outcome of a game can be dependent on the results
in the past. In the case of gambling with side information, we obtain an equality involving
the directed information [32, 33], which is a measure of causal correlations. The derived
Jarzynski-type equalities elucidate the role of information in capital growth in gambling.
We find that, applying Jensen’s inequality to the equalities, the upper bounds of capital
growth rates are reproduced, which is analogous to the derivation of the second law of
thermodynamics from the Jarzynski equality [3]. Some of the equalities in the case of
independent games of gambling that we show here are also derived by Bell and Cover using a
different line of reasoning [34]. In that sense, our main contribution lies in the generalization
of those relations to gambling which has memory effects. Still, for the sake of illustration,
we start with discussing independent games of gambling.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we review the Kelly criterion in games of
binary gambling which are independent and identical. We illustrate how the upper bound of
the average capital growth rate is related to the concepts in information theory. In Sec. III,
we derive several Jarzynski-type equalities for independent games of binary gambling, and
discuss their implications. We introduce a quantity called efficacy as a measure of how
well the gambler bets as well as the quality of side information. In Sec. IV, we extend the
Jarzynski-type equalities for the binary gambling with memory effects, in which the results
can be dependent on the ones in the past. We further generalize the relation to horse races,
which includes the binary betting as a special case. The efficacy is also generalized to the
case with memory effects. In the last section of Sec. IV, we give the unified expression
of the Jarzynski-type equalities in gambling discussed in this paper. Section V is devoted
to summary and outlook. In Appendix A, we summarize the notations for information-
theoretical quantities used in this paper. In Appendix B, we discuss how the Markovian
coin tossing discussed in Sec. IV is mapped to the 1D Ising model.
II. KELLY CRITERION AND INFORMATION THEORY
Let us start by giving a pedagogical review on the Kelly criterion and its relation to
information theory, using a repeated binary gambling where the results are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.). We demonstrate that the upper bound of the average capital
4
growth rate is written in terms of quantities in information theory. In Sec. IIA, we discuss
a simple gambling with binary options and introduce the notion of the Kelly criterion. In
Sec. II B, we study the effect of side information on capital growth.
A. Kelly criterion
Let us consider simple games of gambling. A player has binary options to bet in a game.
If the player wins, the casino pays twice of the betted money to the player. The player
repeats the game many times. Let us denote the fraction of money that the player bets on
the i-th game by fi. The outcome of each game is assumed to be i.i.d. in this section. We
denote the player’s capital before i-th game by Mi. The capital evolves as
Mi −→

Mi(1 + fi) winMi(1− fi) lose . (1)
We introduce a stochastic variable yi ∈ {1,−1} to indicate whether the player has won or
lost in the i-th game. The evolution of the capital is written as
Mi+1 =Mi(1 + fiyi). (2)
The question is: how much should the player bet in order to make money as fast as possible?
Kelly’s recipe is the following. Let us define the growth rate of the player’s capital during n
games by
gn(f
n) ≡
1
n
ln
Mn+1
M1
, (3)
which is a function of the betting fractions fn ≡ {f1, · · · , fn}
3. The fractions fn are con-
trollable variables for the player. Kelly’s advise is to choose fn in such a way to maximize
the average of the capital growth rate (3), which is written as
〈gn(f
n)〉yn =
1
n
〈
ln
Mn+1
M1
〉
yn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
〈ln(1 + fiyi)〉yi =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[pi ln(1 + fi) + p¯i ln(1− fi)] ,
(4)
where pi (p¯i = 1 − pi) is the probability for the player to win (lose) in the i-th game, and
〈· · · 〉y means the average with respect to the variable y. We denote the optimal fractions
by f ∗n = {f ∗1 , · · · , f
∗
n}. Since all the games are i.i.d., p1 = · · · = pn ≡ p, and the optimal
3 We use the superscript to denote the variables collectively in this paper.
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fractions are all the same, f ∗1 = · · · = f
∗
n ≡ f
∗. Thus, 〈gn(f
∗n)〉yn = 〈g1(f
∗
1 )〉y1 ≡ 〈g(f
∗)〉y
and we have only to consider the average capital growth rate in one game. The solution of
d 〈g(f)〉y /df = 0 is readily obtained as
f ∗ = p− p¯, (5)
where p¯ ≡ 1 − p. This choice of the betting fraction to maximize the average of the log
of Mn+1/M1 is called the Kelly criterion [26]. Breiman showed that the Kelly strategy
asymptotically surpasses other strategies in the long run [35]. Since f ∗ should satisfy 0 ≤
f ∗ ≤ 1, p should satisfy p ≥ 1/2. f ∗ ≤ 1 holds for any value of p. When p < 1/2, the player
should not bet, namely f ∗ = 0. The maximum of the average capital growth rate 〈g(f ∗)〉 is
given by
〈g(f ∗)〉 = ln 2− S(Y ), (6)
where S(Y ) is the Shannon entropy of the outcome, which can be written as S(Y ) = S2(p) ≡
−p ln p− p¯ ln p¯. If p is close to 1, S2(p) ≃ 0 and 〈g(f
∗)〉 ≃ ln 2, which means that the player
can almost double the capital every game. On the other hand, if p ≃ 1/2, S2(p) ≃ ln 2
and the player can hardly increase the capital. Kelly noted that the capital growth rate (6)
under the Kelly criterion is nothing but the channel capacity of a binary symmetric channel
with error rate p (or 1− p).
The variance of the growth rate for general f is written as
v[g] =
〈
g2n(f)
〉
− 〈gn(f)〉
2
= pp¯
(
ln
1 + f
1− f
)2
.
(7)
In the case of Kelly betting (f = f ∗),
v[g(f ∗)] = pp¯
(
ln
p
p¯
)2
. (8)
Although the Kelly betting is most profitable in the long run, it is known to be very risky
in a short term and the capital suffers from large fluctuations. In order to reduce the risk
of ruin, a popular strategy is the “fractional Kelly bet,” in which a gambler bets a certain
fraction (say, 1/2) of the Kelly fraction.
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B. Binary gambling with side information
We here consider the binary gambling in the presence of side information. All the games
are assumed to be i.i.d. in this section, and we have only to consider the capital growth rate
at one game. The result of a game is denoted by y ∈ {1,−1}. The player receives the side
information x before betting. We denote the probability distribution of the outcome y for a
given side information x by P (y|x). The player determines the fraction of the capital to bet
based on the side information, so the fraction depends on x, f = fx. The capital evolves as
Mi+1 = Mi(1 + fxy). (9)
We define the capital growth rate as
g(fx) = ln
Mi+1
Mi
= ln(1 + fxy). (10)
Let us calculate the maximum of the average capital growth rate in this case. The Kelly
fraction for a fixed x is given by f ∗x = P (y = 1|x)− P (y = −1|x). It follows that
1 + f ∗xy = 2P (y|x). (11)
The average capital growth rate under the Kelly betting is given by
〈g(f ∗x)〉x,y =
∑
x,y
P (x, y) ln 2P (y|x)
= ln 2− S(Y ) + I(X : Y ),
(12)
where P (x, y) is the joint probability of x and y, S(Y ) = −〈lnP (y)〉 is the Shannon entropy,
and I(X : Y ) ≡ 〈ln [P (x, y)/P (x)P (y)]〉 is the mutual information. This is the maximum
of the average capital growth rate in the presence of side information. The first two terms
are the upper bound in the absence of side information. The third term is the additional
contribution from side information. With the help of side information the upper bound
of the capital growth rate is increased by the amount of the mutual information between
the side information and the result of the gamble, I(X : Y ). This relation quantifies the
financial value of side information.
Let us see this in a concrete example. We consider the case when the player receives the
side information of the form x ∈ {1,−1} from an informant before betting. The value 1
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TABLE I: Joint distribution of the side information and the result of a game, P (x, y), and the
money after betting in the unit of the capital before betting.
(x, y) P (x, y) ratio
(−1,−1) p¯q 1− f−1
(1, 1) pq 1 + f1
(−1, 1) pq¯ 1 + f−1
(1,−1) p¯q¯ 1− f1
(−1) means that “the player is going to win (lose).” Unfortunately, the information from
the informant can be wrong. Let us model the conditional probabilities as
P (x = 1|y = 1) = P (x = −1|y = −1) = q,
P (x = −1|y = 1) = P (x = 1|y = −1) = 1− q ≡ q¯,
(13)
where q is the parameter to quantify the correctness of the side information. The probability
for a player to win (lose) is denoted by p (p¯). The average of g(fx) is (see Table I)
〈g(fx)〉x,y =
∑
x,y
P (x, y) ln(1+fxy) = p¯q ln(1−f−1)+pq ln(1+f1)+pq¯ ln(1+f−1)+p¯q¯ ln(1−f1).
(14)
We can determine the the fractions f ∗−1 and f
∗
1 which give the maximum of 〈g(fx)〉x,y by
solving ∂ 〈g(fx)〉x,y /∂f1 = 0 and ∂ 〈g(fx)〉x,y /∂f−1 = 0. The solution is
f ∗−1 =
pq¯ − p¯q
pq¯ + p¯q
, f ∗1 =
pq − p¯q¯
pq + p¯q¯
. (15)
The maximum of the average capital growth rate reads
〈g(f ∗x)〉x,y = p¯q ln
2p¯q
pq¯ + p¯q
+ pq¯ ln
2pq¯
pq¯ + p¯q
+ pq ln
2pq
pq + p¯q¯
+ p¯q¯ ln
2p¯q¯
pq + p¯q¯
= ln 2− S(Y ) + I(X : Y ),
(16)
where S(Y ) = S2(p) = −p ln p− p¯ ln p¯, and we used P (x = 1) = pq + p¯q¯ and P (x = −1) =
pq¯ + p¯q.
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III. JARZYNSKI-TYPE EQUALITIES FOR INDEPENDENT GAMES OF GAM-
BLING
From the discussion so far, we have learned that the average capital growth rate in
gambling is bounded from above,
g(f) ≤ ln 2− S(Y ), (17)
in the case of the binary gambling without side information, for example. This relation
can be regarded as the “second law” in casinos. If one recalls that the second law of
thermodynamics is derived from an Integral Fluctuation Theorem (IFT), one might wonder
that there may also be a corresponding IFT-like equation which leads to Eq. (17). As is
shown below, there actually exist such equalities for all the situations discussed in Sec. II.
Below we take the outcome of gambling y to be asymmetric, y ∈ {R,−R¯}, where R and
R¯ are positive numbers. We introduce the following quantity,
Q(y = R) =
R¯
R + R¯
, Q(y = −R¯) =
R
R + R¯
. (18)
Q(y) can be regarded as a probability distribution, since Q(y) ∈ (0 : 1) and
∑
y Q(y) = 1.
An important property of Q(y) which is used later extensively is that the average of y over
Q(y) vanishes, ∑
y
yQ(y) = 0. (19)
We also denote
sQy ≡ − lnQ(y). (20)
A. Simple binary gambling
In the gambling of simple binary betting without side information discussed in Sec. IIA,
the following equality holds.
Theorem. 1 Let g(f) be the capital growth rate with a betting fraction f . g(f) satisfies
〈
exp
[
g(f) + sy − s
Q
y
]〉
y
= 1, (21)
where sy = − lnP (y), average of which is the Shannon entropy, 〈sy〉 = S(Y ).
4
4 In the context of non-equilibrium physics, sy is called as the trajectory (stochastic) entropy [11]
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Proof.
LHS =
〈
(1 + fy)
Q(y)
P (y)
〉
y
=
∑
y
(1 + fy)Q(y) = 1, (22)
where we used the normalization of Q(y), and
∑
y Q(y)y = 0. 
Equation (21) expresses the balance between the growth rate and the (stochastic) entropy
of the results. We can reproduce the upper bound of the average capital growth rate under
the Kelly strategy from Eq. (21). Because of the convexity of the exponential function
(exp [〈F 〉] ≤ 〈expF 〉), Eq. (21) implies
〈g(f)〉y ≤ DKL(P (y)||Q(y)), (23)
where DKL(·||·) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence (see Appendix A for definition). In the
case of even-money betting (y ∈ {1,−1}), the bound of the growth rate is written as
〈g(f)〉y ≤ ln 2− S(Y ), (24)
which equals to the upper bound of the capital growth rate (6) obtained by explicitly max-
imizing 〈g(f)〉y.
B. Binary gambling with side information
In the gambling with binary options under side information discussed in Sec. II B, the
capital growth rate satisfies the following equality.
Theorem. 2 Let the betting fraction fx, which is a function of the information x from an
informant. The capital growth rate g(fx) obeys
〈
exp
[
g(fx) + sy − ixy − s
Q
y
]〉
x,y
= 1, (25)
where ixy ≡ ln [P (x, y)/P (x)P (y)], which gives the mutual information when averaged,
〈ixy〉 = I(X : Y ).
5
5 In the discussion of non-equilibrium equalities, ixy is introduced in Refs. [16, 36]. Equation (25) is a
counterpart of the generalized Jarzynski equality under feedback controls.
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Proof.
〈
exp
[
g(fx) + sy − ixy − s
Q
y
]〉
x,y
=
〈
(1 + fxy)
Q(y)
P (y|x)
〉
x,y
=
∑
x,y
(1 + fxy)
P (x, y)Q(y)
P (y|x)
=
∑
x,y
(1 + fxy)P (x)Q(y)
= 1,
(26)
where we used the normalization of Q(y), and
∑
y Q(y)y = 0 in the last line. 
Equation (25) constrains the statistics of the capital growth rate, the entropy of the
results and the obtained side information. By using Jensen’s inequality exp [〈F 〉] ≤ 〈expF 〉,
one can derive the upper bound of 〈g(fx)〉x,y,
〈g(fx)〉x,y ≤ DKL(P (y)||Q(y)) + I(X : Y ). (27)
In the case of even-money betting (y ∈ {1,−1}),
〈g(fx)〉x,y ≤ ln 2− S(Y ) + I(X : Y ), (28)
which coincides with Eq. (12). Again, we were able to derive the Kelly bound from the
equality (25).
In the presence of side information, the RHS of Eq. (21) deviates from unity. Let us
denote this quantity as γ,
γ ≡
〈
exp
[
g(fx) + sy − s
Q
y
]〉
x,y
, (29)
which can be also written as
γ = 1 +
∑
x,y
fxyP (x|y)Q(y). (30)
We refer to γ as efficacy [16], since γ is a measure of how effectively the player uses the side
information. This meaning is evident if one expresses γ as
γ−1 =
〈exp [Axy − ixy]〉
〈exp [Axy]〉 〈exp [−ixy]〉
, (31)
where Axy ≡ g(fx) + sy − s
Q
y , and we used Eq. (25) and a trivial identity 〈exp [−ixy]〉 = 1.
Thus, γ is a measure of correlation between Axy and the mutual information ixy. If the side
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information has no effect on the capital growth, γ = 1. It can be larger than 1 when the side
information contributes to increase the capital growth. To see this explicitly, let us model
the conditional probability P (x|y) as
P (x = −R¯|y = −R¯) = P (x = R|y = R) = q, (32)
P (x = −R¯|y = R) = P (x = R|y = −R¯) = q¯. (33)
The parameter q quantifies the correlation between x and y. The value q = 1/2 corresponds
to no correlation, and q = 1 means a perfect correlation. With parameter q, the efficacy is
expressed as
γ = 1 +
RR¯
R + R¯
(f1 − f−1) (q − q¯) . (34)
In the case of no correlation (q = q¯ = 1/2), the efficacy is unity, γ = 1. Even if q 6= 1/2, if
the player just ignores the obtained side information (f1 = f−1), γ is again unity. If q 6= 1/2
and the player bets well, γ becomes larger than 1.
As we have seen above, the efficacy depends on the choice of betting strategy, as well as
the nature of side information. When the gambler chooses the Kelly strategy, the efficacy
takes a simple form,
γ∗ = 〈exp [ixy]〉x,y =
∑
x,y
P (x|y)P (y|x), (35)
where γ∗ is the efficacy under the Kelly strategy. The upper bound of γ∗ can be found as
γ∗ = 〈exp [ixy]〉x,y =
〈
exp
[
sy − sy|x
]〉
x,y
≤ 〈exp [sy]〉y =
∑
y
1 = NY , (36)
where sy|x ≡ − lnP (y|x) and NY = 2 is the number of possible outcomes, and we used the
property sy|x ≥ 0.
The efficacy can be used to detect the use of side information in gambling. Suppose
there is a gambler in a casino and we do not know whether the gambler is secretly using
insider information. If we know how much the gambler bets, the results of the gamble,
and the probability distribution of the results, we can calculate the quantity inside 〈· · · 〉 in
Eq. (29). Observing the gambler’s behavior in a number of games and taking the average,
we can evaluate the efficacy. The efficacy deviates from unity if the gambler is using the
side information.
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C. Remarks
Several comments on the equalities derived in this section are in order.
• The obtained relations hold for any choice of betting strategy f , and it is not restricted
to the Kelly betting. This is similar to the case of the Jarzynski equality, which holds
for any far-from-equilibrium processes [3].
• In all the cases discussed above (except for the one involving the efficacy), the obtained
equalities can be rewritten in the following form,
〈
eg(f)−g(f
∗)
〉
= 1, (37)
which can be verified by noting 1 + f ∗y = P (y)/Q(y) for the case without side infor-
mation or 1 + f ∗xy = P (y|x)/Q(y) in the presence of side information. Equation (37)
was derived in the case of stock investing by Bell and Cover [34] in a different way.
Since gambling can be treated as a certain form of stock investing, Eq (37) is a special
case of their result. In Sec. IV, we generalize this equality to gambling with memory
effects.
IV. JARZYNSKI-TYPE EQUALITIES FOR GAMBLING WITH MEMORY EF-
FECTS
So far we have assumed that all the games are independent and identical. Here let us
consider more general cases where each gambling can depend on the results in the past.
Namely, we work on the gamble with memory effects. We will find that the Jarzynski-
type equalities can be generalized to those cases. In Sec. IVA, we discuss binary gambling
without side information, and we consider the case with side information in Sec. IVB. In
Sec. IVC, we generalize the equality to more general class of gambling with arbitrary number
of options and arbitrary payment functions. In Sec. IVD, we give a unified expression of
the equalities derived in this paper.
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A. Simple binary gambling
Here we generalize the simple binary gambling without side information to the case with
memory effects. We define the capital growth rate during n games as
gn(f
n) ≡
1
n
ln
Mn+1
M1
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
ln
Mi+1
Mi
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
ln
[
1 + fi(y
i−1)yi
]
, (38)
where fi is the bet fraction on i-th game, and yi ∈ {R,−R¯}. The dependence of f on i
means that the player can change the betting strategy adaptively. The fraction fi = fi(y
i−1)
is a function of the results in the past, yi−1 = {y1, · · · , yi−1}. The average of the capital
growth rate is written as
〈gn(f
n)〉yn =
∑
yn
P (yn)gn(f
n), (39)
where P (yn) = P (y1, · · · , yn) is the joint probability of the results of the games.
We define a probability distribution Q(yn) by
Q(yn) ≡
∏
i
Q(yi), (40)
where Q(yi) is defined by Q(yi = R) = R¯/(R+ R¯) and Q(yi = −R¯) = R/(R+ R¯). Later we
use the properties of Q(yi), ∑
yi
Q(yi) = 1, (41)
and ∑
yi
yiQ(yi) = 0. (42)
We also denote
sQyn ≡ − lnQ(y
n). (43)
Theorem. 3 For binary gambling with memory effects, the capital growth rate gn(f
n)
satisfies 〈
exp
[
ngn(f
n) + syn − s
Q
yn
]〉
yn
= 1, (44)
where syn ≡ − lnP (y
n) = − lnP (y1, · · · , yn).
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Proof.
〈
exp
[
ngn(f
n) + syn − s
Q
yn
]〉
yn
=
∑
yn
n∏
i=1
(1 + fi(y
i−1)yi)Q(yi)
=
∑
yn
(
1 + fn(y
n−1)yn
)
Q(yn)
n−1∏
i=1
(1 + fi(y
i−1)yi)Q(yi).
(45)
Expanding the first bracket, the second term vanishes on summation over yn due to Eq. (42).
Repeating this procedure,〈
exp
[
ngn(f
n) + syn − s
Q
yn
]〉
yn
=
∑
yn
Q(yn) = 1, (46)
where the normalization of Q(yn) [Eq. (41)] is used. 
Applying Jensen’s inequality to Eq. (44) leads to
〈gn(f
n)〉yn ≤
1
n
DKL(P (y
n)||Q(yn)). (47)
The inequality (47) is saturated by choosing the betting fraction as
f ∗i =
RP (yi = R|y
i−1)− R¯P (yi = −R¯|y
i−1)
RR¯
. (48)
With this choice of fraction,
1 + f ∗i yi =
P (yi|y
i−1)
Q(yi)
, (49)
and the average capital growth rate is indeed
〈gn(f
∗n)〉yn =
1
n
∑
yn
P (yn)
n∑
i=1
ln
P (yi|y
i−1)
Q(yi)
=
1
n
DKL(P (y
n)||Q(yn)),
(50)
where we used the decomposition of the joint probability P (yn) =
∏
i P (yi|y
i−1). In the case
of even-money betting (yi ∈ {1,−1}),
〈gn(f
n)〉yn ≤ ln 2−
1
n
S(Y n), (51)
where S(Y n) ≡ −〈lnP (yn)〉yn is the entropy of the outcomes. The maximum of the average
capital growth rate is determined by the entropy of yn, S(Y n). Namely, the amount of
uncertainty rules the amount of money a gambler can make. The more predictable the
sequence of yi is, the more rapidly the player’s capital grows.
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Example (Markovian coin tossing) Let us consider a gamble using a coin. To begin
with, the dealer places a coin on a table. Then, the dealer slaps the table. The coin flips
with some probability depending on how strong the dealer hits the table. If the coin is
a head (tail), the player wins (loses). The next game is done by hitting the table again.
In this gamble, the results have a Markovian memory effect, P (yi|y
i−1) = P (yi|yi−1). We
parametrize the dependence of the result of i-th game on the previous result as
P (yi = 1|yi−1 = −1) = P (yi = −1|yi−1 = 1) = ǫ, (52)
P (yi = 1|yi−1 = 1) = P (yi = −1|yi−1 = −1) = ǫ¯, (53)
where 0 < ǫ < 1 is a constant and ǫ¯ ≡ 1− ǫ. The parameter ǫ is the flipping probability of
the coin. Let us assume that initially the face of the coin is random, P (y0 = 1) = P (y0 =
−1) = 1/2, where y0 is introduced as a dummy variable and note that actual betting starts
from n = 1. In this model, P (yi = 1) = P (yi = −1) = 1/2 for any i and without using
the correlations, it is impossible to increase the capital. A gambler can make money by
exploiting the correlation of the result in the next game with those in the past games enables
a gambler to make money. The entropy of the joint distribution P (yn) = P (y1, · · · , yn) can
be calculated as
S(Y n) = −〈lnP (yn)〉yn
= −
n∑
i=1
〈lnP (yi|yi−1)〉yi,yi−1
= (n− 1)S2(ǫ) + ln 2,
(54)
where S2(ǫ) ≡ −ǫ ln ǫ− ǫ¯ ln ǫ¯. Note that we use the notation in which P (yi|yj) = P (yi) when
yi is empty. For example, P (y1|y0) = P (y1) in Eq. (54). The RHS of Eq. (47) is given by
RHS =
n− 1
n
[ln 2− S2(ǫ)] . (55)
On the other hand, we can explicitly maximize the growth rate by choosing the fraction
so that 1 + f ∗i yi = 2P (yi|yi−1) is satisfied. The average capital growth rate with this choice
of fraction is
〈gn(f
∗)〉yn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
〈ln(1 + f ∗i yi)〉
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
〈ln 2P (yi|yi−1)〉
=
n− 1
n
[ln 2− S2(ǫ)] ,
(56)
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which coincides with the bound (54), and the inequality (47) is saturated. Since the achieved
growth rate (54) is positive, the player has a chance to increase the capital, unless the flipping
of the coin is completely random (i.e., ǫ = 1/2).
The Markovian coin tossing discussed here can be mapped to the 1D Ising model, as
described in Appendix B. The sequence of the results of the coin toss is identified to the
configuration of Ising spins in one dimension.
B. Binary gambling with side information
We here work on the binary gambling with memory effects and side information. On the
i-th game, the player determines the betting fraction based on the outcomes in the past yi−1
and the side information xi = {x1, · · · , xi}, so the fraction is written as fi = fi(x
i, yi−1).
The capital growth rate during n bets is defined as
〈gn(f
n)〉xn,yn ≡
1
n
〈
ln
Mn+1
M1
〉
xn,yn
. (57)
We can show a Jarzynski-type relation in this case as well.
Theorem. 4 For binary betting with memory effects and side information,
〈
exp
[
ngn(f
n) + syn − ixn→yn − s
Q
yn
]〉
xn,yn
= 1, (58)
where
syn ≡ − lnP (y
n), ixn→yn ≡ ln
P (yn||xn)
P (yn)
, sQyn ≡ − lnQ(y
n). (59)
The expression P (yn||xn) ≡
∏
i P (yi|y
i−1, xi) is the probability distribution of yn causally
conditioned on xn.
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Proof. The LHS of Eq. (58) is calculated as
〈
exp
[
ngn(f
n) + syn − ixn→yn − s
Q
yn
]〉
xn,yn
=
〈∏
i(1 + fi(x
i, yi−1)yi)Q(yi)
P (yn||xn)
〉
xn,yn
=
∑
yn,xn
P (yn, xn)
P (yn||xn)
∏
i
(1 + fi(x
i, yi−1)yi)Q(yi)
=
∑
yn,xn
P (xn||yn−1)
∏
i
(1 + fi(x
i, yi−1)yi)Q(yi)
=
∑
yn,xn
∏
i
(1 + fi(x
i, yi−1)yi)P (xi|x
i−1, yi−1)Q(yi)
≡ ♠,
(60)
where we have used the decomposition of the joint probability P (yn, xn) =
P (yn||xn)P (xn||yn−1), and the definition of P (xn||yn−1) (see Appendix A). Let us define
Ai(y
i, xi) ≡ (1 + fi(x
i, yi−1)yi)Q(yi)P (xi|x
i−1, yi−1). The expression ♠ can be written as
♠ =
∑
yn,xn
n∏
i=1
Ai(y
i, xi)
=
∑
yn,xn
An(y
n, xn)
n−1∏
i=1
Ai(y
i, xi)
=
∑
yn,xn
(
1 + fi(x
n, yn−1)yn
)
Q(yn)P (xn|x
n−1, yn−1)
n−1∏
i=1
Ai(y
i, xi).
(61)
If we expand the bracket in the last line, the second term vanishes because it is lin-
ear in yn and
∑
yn
ynQ(yn) = 0. Performing the summation over xn (note that∑
xn
P (xn|x
n−1, yn−1) = 1), and repeating the same procedure for n times,
♠ =
∑
yn,xn−1
Q(yn)
n−1∏
i=1
Ai(y
i, xi) = · · · =
∑
yn
Q(yn) = 1.  (62)
Using Jensen’s inequality to Eq. (58), we obtain the bound for the average capital growth
rate as
〈gn(f
n)〉xn,yn ≤
1
n
DKL(P (y
n)||Q(yn)) +
1
n
Idr(X
n → Y n), (63)
where
Idr(X
n → Y n) ≡ 〈ixn→yn〉xn,yn =
〈
ln
P (yn||xn)
P (yn)
〉
xn,yn
. (64)
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The quantity Idr(X
n → Y n) is the directed information fromXn to Y n, which is a measure of
causal correlations [32, 33, 37]. Correlational measures such as the mutual information and
cross correlations between X and Y are symmetric under the exchange of X and Y , and can
not capture the directionality of influences. The directed information quantifies “directed”
flow of information and is useful in uncovering the causal influences among interacting
systems. The inequality (63) is saturated when the player bets the fraction
f ∗i =
RP (yi = R|y
i−1, xi)− R¯P (yi = −R¯|y
i−1, xi)
RR¯
. (65)
This choice means that “the player should bet the Kelly fraction based on all the available
information.” With this choice of fraction,
1 + f ∗i yi =
P (yi|y
i−1, xi)
Q(yi)
, (66)
and one can readily check that Eq. (63) is saturated. In the case of symmetric betting
(y ∈ {1,−1}), DKL(P (y
n)||Q(yn)) = n ln 2 − S(Y n) and the upper bound of the average
capital growth rate is written as
〈gn(f
n)〉xn,yn ≤ ln 2−
1
n
S(Y n) +
1
n
Idr(X
n → Y n). (67)
Example (Markovian coin tossing with side information) Let us discuss an ex-
tension of the Markovian coin tossing in the previous section. The dealer slaps the table and
tries to flip the coin, as before. This time, the flipping rate on the i-th game is a stochastic
variable. The player infers the flipping rate (the strength for the dealer to slap the table)
from the dealer. We denote the flipping rate of the coin as
P (yi|yi−1, θi) =


θi yi 6= yi−1,
θ¯i yi = yi−1,
(68)
where θi ∈ [0 : 1] is a stochastic variable. The player measures the flipping rate, and
determines the betting fraction based on the measured rate. We assume that the initial face
of the coin is random, P (y0 = 1) = P (y0 = −1) = 1/2.
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Let us calculate the RHS of Eq. (67). The directed information from Θn to Y n reads
Idr(Θ
n → Y n) =
〈
ln
P (yn||θn)
P (yn)
〉
θn,yn
= 〈lnP (y1|θ1)〉y1,θ1 +
n∑
i=2
〈lnP (yi|yi−1, θi)〉yi,yi−1,θi + S(Y
n)
= − ln 2−
n∑
i=2
〈S2(θi)〉θi + S(Y
n),
(69)
where S2(p) ≡ −p ln p− p¯ ln p¯ is the binary entropy function, and we used P (yi) = 1/2 since
the initial state of the coin is randomly chosen. If the face of the coin is independent of the
measured flipping rate, P (yi|yi−1, θi) = P (yi|yi−1), then the directed information vanishes,
Idr(Θ
n → Y n) = 0. Thus, the RHS of Eq. (67) is written as
RHS =
n− 1
n
ln 2−
1
n
n∑
i=2
〈S2(θi)〉θi . (70)
The capital growth rate under the Kelly betting is calculated as follows. Noting that
1 + f(yi−1, θi)yi = 1 + f(yi−1, θi)yi = 2P (yi|yi−1, θi), (71)
the average capital growth rate is
〈g(f ∗n)〉θn,yn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
〈
ln
(
1 + f(yi−1, θi)yi
)〉
=
1
n
n∑
i=2
〈ln 2P (yi|yi−1, θi)〉+
1
n
〈ln 2P (y1|θ1)〉
=
n− 1
n
ln 2−
1
n
n∑
i=2
〈S2(θi)〉θi ,
(72)
where we again used P (yi) = 1/2. This coincides with Eq. (70) and the inequality (67) is
saturated.
Suppose θi obeys a Gaussian distribution with mean p and variance σ
2, and θi for different
i are independent. When σ is small compared to p and p¯ = 1− p, the directed information
Idr(Θ
n → Y n) is approximated as
Idr(Θ
n → Y n) ≃
(n− 1)σ2
2pp¯
. (73)
The additional contribution to maximal capital growth rate due to the side information,
δ 〈g∗〉 ≡ 〈g(f ∗n)〉θn,yn − 〈g(f
∗n)〉yn , is thus written as
δ 〈g∗〉 =
1
n
Idr(Θ
n → Y n) ≃
n− 1
n
σ2
2pp¯
. (74)
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Thus, the randomized flipping rate θi always helps the gambler, and it is an increasing
function of the variance of the flipping rate.
Let us find the expression for the efficacy assuming that the gambler obeys the Kelly
strategy. The efficacy can be defined in an analogous way in to the memoryless case [see
Eq. (92)]. As will be shown in the next section, the efficacy under the Kelly strategy is
written as γ∗ = 〈exp [iθn→yn]〉
1/n. We can calculate γ∗ as
(γ∗)n = 〈exp [iθn→yn ]〉 =
〈
P (yn||θn)
P (yn)
〉
yn,xn
=
∑
yn,θn
P (yn, θn)P (yn||θn)
P (yn)
=
∑
yn,θn
P (y1, θ1)P (y1|θ1)
P (y1)
n∏
i=2
P (yi, θi|yi−1, θi−1)P (yi|yi−1, θi)
P (yi|yi−1)
.
(75)
Noting that P (yi, θi|yi−1, θi−1) = P (yi, θi|yi−1) and P (yi, θi|yi−1) = P (yi|yi−1, θi)P (θi|yi−1) =
P (yi|yi−1, θi)P (θi),
(γ∗)n =
∑
yn,θn
P (y1, θ1)P (y1|θ1)
P (y1)
n∏
i=2
P (yi|yi−1, θi)
2P (θi)
P (yi|yi−1)
. (76)
The summation in Eq. (76) can be calculated in a similar way to the transfer matrix method
for the 1D Ising model. In the current model, the marginal flipping rate that appears in
Eq. (75) is written as
P (yi|yi−1) =
∑
θi
P (yi, θi|yi−1) =
∑
θi
P (yi|yi−1, θi)P (θi) =


p yi 6= yi−1,
p¯ yi = yi−1.
(77)
Let us define matrices Bi as
[Bi]yi yi−1 ≡
∑
θi
P (yi|yi−1, θi)
2P (θi)
P (yi|yi−1)
=

 〈θ¯2i 〉p¯ 〈θi2〉p
〈θi2〉
p
〈θ¯2i 〉
p¯

 =

 p¯2+σ2p¯ p2+σ2p
p2+σ2
p
p¯2+σ2
p¯

 . (78)
The matrices Bi are in fact all the same and we denote them as B ≡ Bi. Noting also that
P (y1) = P (y1|θ1) = 1/2, the efficacy can be expressed by the product of those matrices as
(γ∗)n =
2∑
a=1

 n∏
i=2
Bi

1/2
1/2




a
=
2∑
a=1

(B)n−1

1/2
1/2




a
=
(
1 +
σ2
pp¯
)n−1
.
(79)
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Thus, in the current approximation, the efficacy and the directed information is related by
(from Eq. (73) and Eq. (79))
γ∗ =
(
1 +
2
n− 1
Idr(Θ
n → Y n)
)1− 1
n
. (80)
C. Generalization: horse races with side information
We here generalize the Jarzynski-type equalities to a gambling in which the players have
multiple options to bet with a help of side information6. This situation actually corresponds
to horse races in which each result of a race can depend on the results in the past. Horse
races can be regarded as a generalization of the cases of binary betting discussed in the
previous sections. For the discussion of the upper bound of the capital growth rates in horse
race, see Refs. [39–41].
Let f(yi) and o(yi) be the bet fraction and the odds on the horse yi in the i-th race. We
take
∑
yi
f(yi) = 1, which means that the gambler bets all one’s money in every race. The
capital of the gambler evolves as
Mi+1 = Mif(yi|y
i−1, xi)o(yi|y
i−1), (81)
where yi is the horse that won the i-th race, and xi is the side information for the i-th race
7.
The gambler determines the betting fraction according to the past results and the received
side information, thus f(yi) = f(yi|y
i−1, xi). The odds o(yi|y
i−1) are also a function of the
results in the past. The gambler’s capital during n races is written as
Mn+1 =M1
n∏
i=1
f(yi|y
i−1, xi)o(yi|y
i−1). (82)
We define the capital growth rate after n races as
gn(f
n, on) =
1
n
ln
Mn+1
M1
=
1
n
ln f(yn||xn)o(yn), (83)
6 As another extension, we can also formulate the Jarzynski-type equalities in gambling with more complex
information structures using the Bayesian network. The proof of the equality is almost the same, we just
have to replace P (xn||yn) with Pc(x
n||yn) ≡
∏n
i P (xi|pa(xi)) and similarly for f(y
n||xn) and o(yn||xn).
See Ref. [38].
7 The quantities f and o in Eq. (81) correspond to (1 + yf)Q(y) and 1/Q(y) in the case of binary betting
discussed in the previous subsections.
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where
f(yn||xn) ≡
n∏
i
f(yi|y
i−1, xi), o(yn) ≡
n∏
i=1
o(yi|y
i−1). (84)
Theorem. 5 In horse races with memory effects and side information, the capital growth
rate gn satisfies
〈exp [ngn(f
n, on) + syn − ixn→yn − ln o(y
n)]〉yn,xn = 1, (85)
where
syn ≡ − lnP (y
n), ixn→yn ≡ ln
P (yn||xn)
P (yn)
. (86)
Proof.
〈exp [ngn(f
n, on) + syn − ixn→yn − ln o(y
n)]〉yn,xn =
〈
f(yn||xn)
P (yn||xn)
〉
yn,xn
=
∑
yn,xn
f(yn||xn)
P (yn, xn)
P (yn||xn)
=
∑
yn,xn
f(yn||xn)P (xn||yn−1)
= 1,
(87)
where we have used the decomposition of P (xn, yn), and
∑
yn,xn
f(yn||xn)P (xn||yn−1) = 1. (88)
This relation can be shown by noting
∑
yi
f(yi|y
i−1) = 1 and
∑
xi
P (xi|x
i−1, yi−1) = 1. 
Using Jensen’s inequality, we obtain the bound for capital growth,
〈gn(f
n, on)〉yn,xn ≤
1
n
〈ln o(yn)〉yn,xn −
1
n
S(Y n) +
1
n
Idr(X
n → Y n), (89)
where we have used 〈ixn→yn〉xn,yn = Idr(X
n → Y n). Under the “fair and uniform” odds
(o(yi|y
i−1) = M for any i, where M is the number of horses in a race),
〈gn(f
n, on)〉yn,xn ≤ lnM −
1
n
S(Y n) +
1
n
Idr(X
n → Y n), (90)
which reproduces the results obtained in Refs. [40, 41]. The upper bound (89) is achieved
when the player chooses the betting fraction as
f(yi|y
i−1, xi) = P (yi|y
i−1, xi). (91)
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The efficacy can also be straightforwardly extended to the case with memory effects,
which we define as
γ ≡
(
〈exp [ngn(f
n, on) + syn − ln o(y
n)]〉yn,xn
)1/n
. (92)
The efficacy is also written as
γ−n =
〈exp [Axnyn − ixn→yn]〉yn,xn
〈exp [Axnyn ]〉yn,xn 〈exp [−ixn→yn ]〉yn,xn
, (93)
where Axnyn ≡ ngn(f
n, on) + syn − ln o(y
n), and we used 〈exp [−ixn→yn]〉yn,xn = 1 and
Eq. (85). From the expression (93), it is clear that the efficacy measures correlation between
the capital growth rate and information flow. If the gambler is to take the Kelly strategy,
the efficacy is written as γ∗ =
(
〈exp [ixn→yn]〉yn,xn
)1/n
, which can be shown as
(γ∗)n = 〈exp [ngn(f
n, on) + syn − ln o(y
n)]〉yn,xn
=
〈
f(yn||xn)
P (yn)
〉
yn,xn
=
〈
P (yn||xn)
P (yn)
〉
yn,xn
= 〈exp [ixn→yn ]〉yn,xn ,
(94)
where the fact that f(yn||xn) = P (yn||xn) holds for the Kelly betting is used. The upper
bound of γ∗ is found as
γ∗ =
(
〈exp [ixn→yn]〉yn,xn
)1/n
=
(〈
exp
[
syn − syn||xn
]〉
yn,xn
)1/n
≤
(
〈exp [syn ]〉yn
)1/n
=
(∑
yn
1
)1/n
=M,
(95)
where syn||xn ≡ − lnP (y
n||xn) and and we used the property syn||xn ≥ 0.
24
D. Unified expression of the Jarzynski-type equality in gambling
Here we give the unified expression of the Jarzynski-equalities in gambling. The equalities
of the form 〈· · · 〉 = 1 shown in this paper can be written in the following form,
〈
en[gn(f
n)−gn(f∗n)]
〉
yn,xn
= 1, (96)
where fn are the betting fractions for n games, and f ∗n are the betting fractions under the
Kelly strategy. The betting fractions fn can depend on the results in the past, and also on
the side information. This equality holds regardless of the choice of the betting fractions fn.
Equation (96) is a generalization of Bell and Cover’s result [34] to gambling with memory
effects.
V. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we derived novel Jarzynski-type equalities in gambling. Based on those
relations, we discussed how the side information or the memory effects affect the capital
growth of a gambler. The main results of this paper are summarized as follows:
• Simple binary gambling → Eqs. (21) and (44)
• Binary gambling with side information → Eqs. (25) and (58)
• Horse races with side information and memory effects → Eq. (85)
• Introduction of the efficacy → Eqs. (29) and (92)
The equality for horse races is the most general one. We also gave the unified expression of
the Jarzynski-type relations shown this paper (except for the one involving the efficacy) in
Eq. (96). Those equalities reproduce the known Kelly bounds of the capital growth rates
by applying Jensen’s inequality. In the case of betting with side information, the financial
value of the information is quantified by the mutual information in independently repeated
gambling and by the directed information for gambling with memory effects. We defined
the efficacy in Eqs. (29) and (92), which is a measure of how well the gambler makes use of
the side information. We showed that the efficacy allows for a simple expression [Eqs. (35)
and (94)] when the gambler bets under the Kelly strategy, and discussed its upper bound.
Finally, let us comment on possible future directions.
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• Application to actual gambling. An interesting direction is the analysis of actual gam-
bling. A good candidate would be blackjack. In blackjack, a player can improve the
return by exploiting the information of the cards which are already open to the floor.
This method is called “card counting” [30]. The player assigns a number for each
card, and sums up the number for all the dealt cards. The sum is called the count,
which is a measure of the card composition of the shoe. The true count, which is the
count divided by the number of remaining decks, is indicative of the expected return.
There are many possible choices of the weights on the cards. The performance of a
counting system is evaluated by a quantity called betting correlation. It is possible to
estimate the growth rate of wealth under the Kelly criterion as a function of betting
correlations8.
• Extension to stock investing. Although we focused on gambling in this paper, extension
of such equalities to stock investing is quite interesting. Such concepts as the Jarzynski-
equality and the fluctuation theorems developed in non-equilibrium physics might be
useful in uncovering the role of information in the financial world.
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Appendix A: Notations and definitions
Here we summarize notations and definitions of information-theoretical quantities used
in the text.
A realization of a stochastic variable X is represented by its small letter, x in this case.
8 Mathematical aspects of blackjack are comprehensively analyzed in a recent book by Werthamer [42].
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Let {xi}, {yi} be time-sequences of stochastic variables. A variable with a superscript n
indicates variables from 1 to n collectively,
xn ≡ {x1, · · · , xn}. (A1)
We assume that the dependences of the variables xn are causal, by which we mean that
the probability distribution P (xi) is dependent on xj only if j < i. The joint probability
P (xn) is decomposed as
P (xn) =
∏
i
P (xi|x
i−1), (A2)
where P (x|y) is the conditional probability.
The average over variables {x, y, · · · } is expressed by 〈· · · 〉x,y,···. Subscript may be omit-
ted, in that case the average is taken over all the stochastic variables.
The Shannon entropy of Xn = {X1, · · · , Xn} is
S(Xn) ≡ −〈lnP (xn)〉xn = −
∑
xn
P (xn) lnP (xn). (A3)
The Kullback-Leibler divergence of a distribution Q(y) from another distribution P (y) is
defined by
DKL (P (y)||Q(y)) ≡
∑
y
P (y) ln
P (y)
Q(y)
. (A4)
The mutual information between the stochastic variable X and Y is defined by
I(X : Y ) ≡
〈
ln
P (x, y)
P (x)P (y)
〉
x,y
=
∑
x,y
P (x, y) ln
P (x, y)
P (x)P (y)
. (A5)
We used the following causal conditioning notations developed by Kramer [33]. The
probability distribution of xn causally conditioned on yn−d is denoted as
P (xn||yn−d) ≡
n∏
i=1
P (xi|x
i−1, yi−d). (A6)
We use a convention that, if i − d ≤ 0, yi−d is set to null. Mostly, the cases with d = 0, 1
are used:
P (xn||yn) =
n∏
i=1
P (xi|x
i−1, yi), (A7)
P (xn||yn−1) =
n∏
i=1
P (xi|x
i−1, yi−1). (A8)
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The joint probability of xn and yn is decomposed as
P (xn, yn) = P (xn||yn)P (yn||xn−1). (A9)
∵ P (xn, yn) =
∏
i
P (xi, yi|x
i−1, yi−1)
=
∏
i
P (xi|x
i−1, yi)P (yi|x
i−1, yi−1)
= P (xn||yn)P (yn||xn−1).
(A10)
The causally conditional entropy is defined as
S(Xn||Y n) ≡ −〈lnP (xn||yn)〉 =
n∑
i=1
S(Xi|X
i−1, Y i). (A11)
The directed information, introduced by Massey [32], is defined as
Idr(Y
n → Xn) ≡ S(Xn)− S(Xn||Y n). (A12)
It can be explicitly written as
Idr(Y
n → Xn) =
〈
ln
P (xn||yn)
P (xn)
〉
=
∑
i
〈
ln
P (xi+1|x
i, yi+1)
P (xi+1|xi)
〉
. (A13)
Appendix B: Markovian coin tossing and 1D Ising model
We here show the equivalence of the Markovian coin tossing discussed in Sec. IVA with
the 1D Ising model. Without loss of generality, we can parametrize the conditional proba-
bility P (yi+1|yi) as
P (yi+1|yi) =
exp [βJ yi+1yi]
2 cosh βJ
. (B1)
One can see 0 < P (yi+1|yi) < 1 and the normalization condition
∑
yi+1
P (yi+1|yi) = 1 is
satisfied. The new parameter J can be related to the flipping rate ǫ as
βJ =
1
2
ln
ǫ¯
ǫ
. (B2)
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By rewriting the normalization condition of P (yn) in the following way, the correspondence
to the Ising model is evident:
1 =
∑
yn
P (yn)
=
∑
yn
exp
[∑
i
lnP (yi+1|yi)
]
=
1
(2 cosh βJ)n
∑
yn
exp
[∑
i
βJ yi+1yi
]
≡
tr
[
e−βH
]
Z
.
(B3)
Thus, the numerator is the definition of the partition function of the Ising model without
external fields. The average of the exponential of g is written as
〈exp [ngn]〉yn =
∑
yn
P (yn)
∏
i
(1 + fiyi)
=
1
(2 cosh βJ)n
∑
yn
exp
[∑
i
βJ yi+1yi +
∑
i
ln(1 + fiyi)
]
.
(B4)
When fi(yi|y
i−1) is independent of yi−1, the numerator of RHS is the partition function of
the Ising model in a weird form of magnetic field. In one dimension, the symmetry breaking
never occurs in the Ising model at finite temperature. In the context of the Markovian coin
tossing, the absence of symmetry breaking corresponds to the fact that, at finite values of
ǫ, the coin flips after finite number of trials, and the “magnetization” always vanishes,
lim
n→∞
1
n
∑
i
〈yi〉 = 0. (B5)
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